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ABSTRACT
Why did the European Union (EU) launch a naval operation in response
to the migration crisis, despite the humanitarian character of the
challenge at hand, doubts about the effectiveness of a military
response, and the EU’s traditional focus on civilian means? Integrating
institutionalist theory and the literature on crisis response, this article
argues that EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia is an example of
copying through contingent learning wherein the EU’s response to
the migration crisis was shaped by naval missions Operation Mare
Nostrum and Operation Atalanta. While the former set a precedent
for a naval response to migration in the Mediterranean, the latter
provided an off-the-shelf institutional blueprint for the design and
implementation of Operation Sophia. In a crisis situation characterised
by high uncertainty, and with little time to rethink policies or to
create new structures, EU political actors used contingent learning to
quickly evaluate potential policy responses and institutional reforms,
leading them to the decision to copy past institutional designs and
practices previously considered successful. This finding has relevance
beyond the case of Operation Sophia, as it contributes to a better
understanding of why a particular type of policy or action is chosen
in times of crisis and urgency.
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Why did the European Union (EU) launch a naval operation at the height of the migration
crisis in the Central Mediterranean? EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia was established in
June 2015 under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Sophia is one of
the few widely agreed-upon policies to respond to the migration crisis (Riddervold 2018b,
Riddervold et al. 2020). The choice of a military response to a civilian crisis, however, is
surprising given the EU’s operational tilt towards civilian missions and its limited experi-
ence in naval deployments (Smith 2017). Previous studies of Sophia have shown that the
EU’s decision to act in response to the migration crisis was driven by the humanitarian
crisis unfolding at its borders (Riddervold 2018a, 2018b), rising concerns about a
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smuggling-terrorism nexus (Boșilcă 2017), the security imperative of border protection
(Moreno-Lax 2018), and Italian security and humanitarian policy goals (Nováky 2018).
Yet explaining the EU’s preference for a particular type of policy, i.e. a military oper-
ation, still remains unaccounted for. After all, the EU has a wide toolbox at its disposal,
most of which is linked to various civilian instruments. Moreover, neither the persistent
blockage in the negotiations on the reform of the Common European Asylum System
(CEAS) and the inability of member states to agree on asylum policies, nor humanitarian
concerns related to the loss of life at sea can explain the EU’s choice of a naval operation.
Instead, the EU could have focused on revising and rethinking current reform proposals,
launching civilian search and rescue (SAR) missions, or finding ways to protect asylum
seekers reaching European soil. From a security perspective, a military mission is hardly
the most efficient solution to this type of challenge either. The launch of a mission
appears even more striking in light of the widespread criticism attracted by militarised
maritime interventions and restrictive border policies in the Mediterranean, which
more often than not have aggravated both the security and the humanitarian situation
(Moreno-Lax 2018). As late as 2015, even the EU Military Committee questioned
whether a naval mission would be an appropriate response to the crisis (Johansen
2020, pp. 185–186). Adding to this, the CSDP is often referred to as a least likely area of
EU integration, with member states often struggling to find common ground (Jørgensen
et al. 2015). So why then, in spite of the civilian and humanitarian character of the chal-
lenge at hand, doubts about a naval mission’s effectiveness, and the EU’s traditional focus
on civilian means, did the EU nonetheless decide to pursue a military response?
Integrating institutionalist theoretical lenses and the literature on crisis response, this
article argues that the EU’s response is an example of “copying” (Verdun 2015), wherein
the EU’s response to the migration crisis was shaped in significant ways by predecessor
missions at both national and EU levels: most prominently, Operation Mare Nostrum
and Operation Atalanta. From these two operations, we see conscious emulation of prac-
tices as well as the copying of pre-existing institutions. Further developing Verdun’s
(2015) concept of copying, we suggest that in a crisis situation characterised by high
uncertainty, and with little time to rethink policies or to create new structures ex novo,
EU political actors use contingent learning (Kamkhaji and Radaelli 2017) to quickly evalu-
ate potential policy responses and institutional reforms, leading them to the decision to
copy past institutional designs and practices previously considered successful. This
finding, we argue, has relevance beyond Sophia, as it contributes to a better understand-
ing of why a particular type of policy or action is chosen in times of crisis and urgency –
something that is often the case with the EU’s event-driven foreign and security policy.
With a new naval mission, Irini, already agreed (Council 2020), a systematic study of the
processes leading to the development of Operation Sophia also has broader relevance
for our understanding of how the EU designs and conducts such missions.
To substantiate our argument that copying is key to understanding Operation Sophia,
the article proceeds as follows. We first provide a brief overview of the mission. Then, we
introduce our analytical framework, discussing the concept of copying through contin-
gent learning as a decision-making mechanism in times of crisis. The next section contains
the analysis and is divided into three parts. The first part explores how the massive drown-
ings near Lampedusa in April 2015 marked a critical juncture in the EU’s response to the
migration crisis, facilitating the transfer of existing strategic and operational templates
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into new settings. The second part examines how the Italian operation Mare Nostrum
served as an example of a naval response to a migration crisis. The third part then inves-
tigates the specific ways in which the EU counter-piracy practices and structures in the
Indian Ocean have offered an institutional template for Operation Sophia in the Mediter-
ranean, and have significantly shaped its format and focus. The concluding section sum-
marises the main findings and discusses their empirical and theoretical implications. It
must be underlined, however, that we do not assess Sophia’s impact and relation to
the EU’s broader migration policies or the effectiveness or normative validity of Sophia.
Other studies explore these aspects extensively. For instance, Cusumano (2019a) exam-
ines the organised hypocrisy caused by the tension between norms and interests in EU
foreign policy and migration management; Aalberts and Gammeltoft-Hansen (2014)
discuss the broader politics attached to SAR operations in the Mediterranean; Tazzioli
(2016) and Tazzioli and Garelli (2020) critique the use of military operations in maritime
migration governance; Little and Vaughan-Williams (2017) and Pallister-Wilkins (2015)
analyse how humanitarianism supports deterrence-based discourses; Cusumano and
Villa (2019) find that maritime rescue operations are not a pull factor for migration,
while various NGOs have raised human rights concerns linked to the EU’s naval approach
(Amnesty International 2017. Also see Riddervold 2018b).1 Although all of these issues are
key to understanding both the EU’s migration policies and the role of Sophia, our focus
remains on explaining the EU’s choice of a military response and by this illustrating the
relevance of copying in EU security and defence policies more broadly.
2. EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia
Operation Sophia was established on 22 June 2015 as the first EU maritime security oper-
ation in the Central Mediterranean. The core mandate was to “undertake systematic
efforts to identify, capture, and dispose of vessels used or suspected of being used by
smugglers and traffickers” (Council of the EU 2015). This type of disruption could be
seen as a maritime implementation of processes of containment that also hampered
migrant movement upon arrival in Europe (Tazzioli and Garelli 2018). While not explicitly
included in its official mandate, the operation also conducted some limited number of
SAR operations on the most trafficked maritime routes (Cusumano 2019b).
The operation was originally planned in four sequential phases. During the first phase,
Sophia patrolled the high seas and gathered intelligence on smuggling activities and
methods. The second phase distinguished between two different operational areas.
During phase 2A, EU ships were allowed to board, search, and divert smugglers’ vessels
on the high seas, subject to the conditions and limitations arising from applicable inter-
national law. Phase 2B would extend these tasks into Libyan territorial waters with an
appropriate UNSC mandate, the consent of Libyan authorities, and a “legal finish”, i.e.
handling suspected smugglers either by prosecuting them in another member state, or
in Libyan courts. The third phase would expand the EU mandate to take “all necessary
measures” against suspected vessels – including onshore in Libya. Finally, the fourth
phase envisaged the withdrawal of forces and the completion of the operation. The
lack of a legal basis however prevented the full implementation of the mandate, and
Sophia only reached phase 2A of the mandate, in October 2015 (EEAS 2016).
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In June 2016, the Council bolstered the operation by adding two supporting tasks:
first, capacity building and training of the Libyan navy and coastguard (LNCG), and
second, contributing to the implementation of a UN arms embargo off the coast
of Libya (Council 2016). In July 2017, the mandate was further expanded to
include surveillance activities and information gathering on the illegal trafficking of
oil exports from Libya (Council 2017). Additionally, a new mechanism was set up
to monitor the training of the Libyan forces, and information exchange on human
trafficking with member states and law enforcement agencies (e.g. Frontex and
Europol) was intensified (Council 2017).
After being extended three times successively, the operation was renewed for two
additional six-month extensions but was drastically downsized through the suspension
of its naval patrols (Council 2019) before being phased out on 31 March 2020. In February
2020, the EU Foreign Affairs Council agreed to replace Sophia with Irini, a new operation
in the Mediterranean (Council 2020).
3. Crisis response and copying
Studies of crisis response often start from rationalist assumptions, expecting actors to
choose the most efficient means to deal with a particular challenge or situation (for a dis-
cussion see Ansell et al. 2017). This, we argue, was not the case with Operation Sophia.
Instead, drawing on institutionalist concepts and literature on crisis response, we argue
that Sophia can best be understood as an example of copying. The climax of the huma-
nitarian crisis in the Mediterranean functioned as a critical juncture, opening a window of
opportunity for EU actors to suggest the development of a new policy. However, path-
dependent policy choices have shaped the EU’s response, as its particular actions
“were built on previous institutions or were inspired by structures that had been
created before” (Verdun 2015, p. 231). In other words, rather than developing new policies
and instruments from scratch in a time of crisis, the EU “copied” an existing successful
policy tool to apply to a new situation. In the case of the migration crisis, the EU used
the normative precedent set by the Italian Operation Mare Nostrum to pursue a naval
response, while adopting the specific institutional structures of its own successful naval
mission: Operation Atalanta, an anti-piracy mission. In this sense, the EU’s response to
the migration crisis is reflective of Verdun (2015)’s account of the EU’s institutional
response to the financial crisis.
Building on Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) four ideal types of institutional change (“dis-
placement”, “layering”, “drift”, and “conversion”), Verdun argues that various EU insti-
tutions created in response to the financial crisis are the output of a “copying” process,
whereby new institutions are directly borrowed from existing institutions (2015, p. 232).
We add to this argument by specifying the micro-mechanism by which actors decide
to resort to such copying, drawing on the concept of contingent learning. We also con-
tribute to the existing literature by showing that copying can be understood not only
as the creation of new institutions by borrowing from earlier institutions but also as
the establishment of new actions or policy tools based on existing ones. Crisis, where
rapid response is needed and actors have limited opportunities to assess alternatives,
makes copying an especially viable option in the event-driven security and defence
policy areas.
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More precisely, theoretically, our concept of copying rests on the combination of two
key explanatory concepts of stability and change: path dependence and critical junctures.
While critical junctures allow us to understand change – i.e. a decision on a new policy,
institution or action – path dependence linked to copying through contingent learning
helps explain why new decisions often emulate existing institutions and policies.
Institutional perspectives have traditionally focused on how institutions persist over
time and on how behavioural patterns within such institutions are reproduced due to par-
ticular norms and structures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). A key assumption is that insti-
tutions are “‘sticky’ or inertial, as expressed in the idea that institutions are path-
dependent and reinforced through feedback effects” (Ansell 2020, forthcoming Decem-
ber 2020). Previous institutional choices and experiences are, alongside institutionalised
socialisation and learning processes, key to understanding how and what new insti-
tutional decisions are made in a given situation (March and Olsen 1998, Olsen 2009).
As a result, earlier decisions influence and constrain the range of options considered by
the decision-making actors. Several studies have suggested that processes of path depen-
dence and socialisation are important for understanding institutional choices in the EU’s
foreign and security polices (see for example, Mayer 2008, Juncos and Pomorska 2020,
forthcoming December 2020).
Institutions, however, are not immutable. Policy change and new institutional arrange-
ments can emerge from “critical junctures”, defined as “relatively short periods of time
during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will
affect the outcome of interest” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, p. 348, emphasis in original).
Critical junctures act as windows of opportunity that actors may use to suggest insti-
tutional or policy changes that might not be possible or likely under normal circum-
stances (Keeler 1993, Cortell and Peterson 1999). While external crises do not
necessarily act as a critical juncture and do not always predict that policy or institutional
reform will take place (Capoccia 2015), they can if politics dictates that leaders meet the
moment with action. Oftentimes those most prepared to meet the moment are those
with policy solutions readily prepared (Roos and Zaun 2016).
In the context of the EU, crises have often functioned as critical junctures enabling pol-
itical actors to put forth new institutional and policy responses (Ansell et al. 2017, Ridder-
vold et al. 2020). At the same time, due to path dependence, these suggestions are often
affected by previous knowledge. The initial stage of crisis response, where action is
required immediately, is an example of Kamkhaji and Radaelli’s (2017) concept of “contin-
gent learning”. This process differs from traditional policy learning and isomorphism,
including the policy learning often associated with critical analysis of the aftermath of
crisis or disaster,2 in that the requirement of immediate action means that many tra-
ditional forms of policy learning are unavailable to decision-makers. Crisis response is
even more difficult when contending with transboundary crises, which further increase
already heightened uncertainty (Ansell et al. 2010). As a transboundary crisis, there is
often no obvious preset institutional “home” to manage the crisis response (Boin et al.
2013). The uncertainty of this situation thus makes copying more likely. Decision-
makers often learn from existing models and historical analogies, though those decisions
are filtered through individual cognitive biases (Levy 1994). These cognitive biases affect
the perceptions of options available to a decision-maker in times of crisis (Kamkhaji and
Radaelli 2017, p. 723). In line with this, and as we will see, in the case of the maritime
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response to the migration crisis, the possible solutions took the form of models already in
use by the EU and one of its most directly affected member states, Italy, which sought
leadership on the migration issue.
4. Analysis3
4.1. The Lampedusa shipwrecks as a critical juncture
Irregular migration in the Central Mediterranean had been a long-standing point of con-
tention among EU member states (Klepp 2010, Aalberts and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014).
As migration increased following the Libyan civil war, rhetoric portraying migration as
a crisis increased, beginning the process of mobilisation that would ultimately enable
the EU to act (Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins 2016). This framing had two tangible
effects that impacted the policies ultimately pursued under Operation Sophia. First,
migrants were framed as in need of rescue, leading to an emphasis on SAR missions.
Second, migrants were depicted as a security risk (Guilfoyle 2016). Ultimately, these
frames helped to mobilise support for a deterrence strategy, which could tackle both
frames simultaneously (Dimitriadi 2014, Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017).
The death of more than 800 people in two consecutive shipwrecks near Lampedusa on
18 April 2015 functioned as a critical juncture in the EU’s decision to launch Operation
Sophia. While the phenomenon of mass migration was not new and such occurrences
were frequent, this episode was the deadliest single incident in the Mediterranean in
decades. The shipwrecks opened up a brief period when new policy options that were
previously unavailable now became possible. A number of member states, including
Spain, Greece, and France, already supported closer integration in the field of maritime
security. Yet other countries such as the UK and Germany had been more hesitant
about a naval operation under the EU command. This changed, however, in the aftermath
of the Lampedusa events. Prime Minister Cameron pledged to step up SAR efforts and
called for additional measures to apprehend human traffickers (BBC 2015), while Chancel-
lor Merkel provided reassurances that the government would “do everything” to prevent
further loss of life at sea (Reuters 2015). As the then commander of Sophia summed up:
“this very serious incident provided an impetus for the EU to take common action […]”
(Senato della Repubblica 2016, p. 4). Tardy (2015, p. 1) similarly notes that the operation
was set up “after a series of mass drownings”. Echoing these views, Blockmans (2016, p. 3)
explains the surge of interest in migration issues in relation to “a rise in fatalities at sea”.
Our interviews4 also suggest that the April shipwrecks, along with the intense media
attention and public outcry that followed, acted as strong catalysts for an EU response.
During this window of opportunity, the EEAS, together with the High Representative of
the EU/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) staff in the Commission and supported
by some member states, suggested the launch of a naval mission (Johansen 2020). And
only two days after the shipwrecks, the Foreign and Interior Ministers convened in a
special joint meeting adopted a set of immediate actions to respond to the migration
crisis. These included, amongst others, the systematic capture and destruction of the
vessels used by smugglers or traffickers, following the example set by Operation Atalanta
in the Gulf of Aden (European Commission 2015). The proposal was endorsed by an extra-
ordinary European Council meeting, where the HR/VP was directed to immediately
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prepare plans for a “possible CSDP operation” to disrupt migrant smuggling networks
(European Council 2015). The decision-making process leading to the operation unfolded
at an unprecedented pace. Normally, EU decision-making is slow, and even if the CSDP is
largely event-driven, the decision to launch a mission often takes many months. Instead,
the practical launch of an operation which would have normally required “between four
and six months” of preparations, was agreed “within a week” by 28 member states with
“initially very different positions on the subject” (Senato della Repubblica 2016, p. 5). The
operation was established on 18 May and officially launched just over a month later, on 22
June. In the word of one of our interviewees “from that moment, a real marathon started
so that the operation’s naval task force […] would reach full operational capacity on 27
July”.5
To make these rapid developments possible, however, the normal planning process
was “fast tracked” by deliberately leaving out certain steps to enable the EU to deploy
forces on short notice (Nováky 2018, p. 205). Moreover, Italy –which had been advocating
for an EU counter-smuggling naval operation since 2013 – and HR/VP Mogherini pressed
hard for an accelerated procedure (Nováky 2018).
Interviews6 indicate that with little time available to plan the operation, EU policy-
makers often fall back on familiar solutions and previous expertise. As argued by one
naval officer at the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) of Sophia, “the experience gained
by the EU in establishing Atalanta was useful during the initial stages of Sophia, when
the latter operation was started at short notice”.7 In establishing a mission in this situation,
the EU turned to its own and its member states’ experiences. And the two most salient
familiar solutions, each of which Sophia drew upon, were the Italian naval Operation
Mare Nostrum and the EU-led Operation Atalanta. Mare Nostrum had already operated
successfully in the same waters, while Atalanta, the EU’s anti-piracy naval operation,
had deterred and disrupted Somali-based piracy, and had protected shipping off the
Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean.
4.2. From Mare Nostrum to Operation Sophia
Existing political debate in Italy had already linked migration and security issues long
before the emergence of the critical juncture at the EU level around the migration
crisis (Angelescu 2008, Cusumano 2019a, 2019b, Panebianco 2016). The Italian govern-
ment quickly implemented Operation Mare Nostrum in October 2013 after a separate
large loss of life near Lampedusa. Mare Nostrum was primarily a naval operation, as
opposed to being run by the Italian Coast Guard, setting a precedent followed by
Sophia. Naval vessels patrolled well beyond Italian territorial waters with an explicit
SAR mission, ultimately rescuing over 150,000 migrants (Carrera and den Hertog 2015).
While the Italian government had maintained seaborne rescue missions since 2004,
Mare Nostrum represented a large increase in the budget and capacity of Italian rescue
operations and proved unsustainable for the Italian government (Patalano 2015). Costs
eventually exceeded €9 million monthly, well beyond the initial budget, and were
borne almost entirely by Italy.
Given the quickly increasing costs, Italy sought an EU-level response and terminated
Mare Nostrum at the end of October 2014. The EU initially responded with Operation
Triton, operated by the European Union’s border control agency, Frontex. This mission
EUROPEAN SECURITY 7
was pushed for by the Italian government, which also developed its own successor naval-
led military mission, Mare Sicuro, at the national level, but with reduced costs and scope
(Dibenedetto 2019). Triton, similarly, was narrower in scope than Mare Nostrum, even
with the involvement of other EU countries. Much like Mare Nostrum, Triton was criticised
as a potential pull factor for migrants, although unlike Mare Nostrum it lacked an active
SAR component and focused exclusively on border surveillance. The British Foreign Office,
for instance, had announced that the UK would not participate in Triton fearing an “unin-
tended pull factor”, whereas the German Interior Minister had felt dubious about the
Italian Operation Mare Nostrum, seen as a “bridge to Europe” (DW 2014). Triton also
had a reduced geographic scope compared to Mare Nostrum and a smaller budget
(though this budget was increased following the April 2015 critical juncture). While
Triton is a more direct successor mission on paper, albeit with much smaller scope,
copying from Mare Nostrum clearly influenced the decision to launch Operation Sophia.
The Italian government sought a CSDP solution as a replacement for Mare Nostrum as
early as 2013, though it was unsuccessful at persuading other member states (Nováky
2018, p. 201). Ultimately, as the politics of the Central Mediterranean migration crisis
changed following the April 2015 critical juncture, this Italian goal was realised. The
Italian experience of a naval mission to respond to the migration crisis made this an
easy solution for the EU to choose in a crisis situation, especially given the prominence
and well-publicised successes of Mare Nostrum. As argued by Johansen (2020, p. 172),
“the Lampedusa accident created a new momentum for the Italian proposal for a CSDP
naval operation”. Following the accident, a 10-point action plan was quickly drafted by
the HR/VP together with the Commission, where “the Italian naval operation re-
emerged” (Johansen 2020). And this time, due to the Lampedusa events, the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs felt pressured to respond immediately, rapidly accepting the proposal
that was on the table (Riddervold 2018b).
This is not to say that all aspects of Mare Nostrum were carried over. Mare Nostrum
focused largely on SAR activities, while Operation Sophia had a legal basis in anti-smug-
gling agreements – though rescue was still a component as required by international mar-
itime law (Gauci and Mallia 2017). However, while this was a legal shift, it followed an
increasing use of the rhetoric of containment and securitisation, targeting boats carrying
smugglers in the hopes of reducing the need for rescue (Tazzioli 2016). More importantly,
the clearest parallel between Mare Nostrum and Sophia was the duplication of the oper-
ation’s command structure. Sophia was likewise structured as a naval operation, using
larger vessels and extending well beyond domestic territorial waters (Boșilcă 2017,
Moreno-Lax 2018, Nováky 2018).
4.3. From Operation Atalanta to Operation Sophia
The pre-existence of a naval SAR mission in the Mediterranean influenced the EU’s choice
to launch a naval mission in the region. Once the Lampedusa events created a sense of
urgency, the HR/VP and the Commission were quick to suggest a new mission based
on the previous operation in the area. Sophia was carried out in the same waters, and
some of the same ships joined the new EU mission.
At the same time, however, the operation and institutional setting of Sophia can be
traced back to Atalanta. While Mare Nostrum created a precedent for a naval response
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to migration, Atalanta provided the institutional template that the EU drew on when
designing the mission: when looking for a proposal, the EU institutions emulated past
institutional designs and practices considered successful.
Fighting piracy, however, is operationally very different from countering smuggling:
whereas pirates make their profit at sea, traffickers and smugglers make theirs on land,
irrespective of the fate of the boats. Destroying the vessels once they set sail thus not
only failed to disrupt smuggling networks or reduce the number of arrivals but also
resulted in more dangerous crossings at sea (UKHL 2017). Unlike Atalanta, Operation
Sophia also lacked a UNmandate to operate in the Libyan territorial waters; thus, its effec-
tiveness was increasingly called into question.8 Another major difference between the
two operations was the “legal finish”. EU personnel lacked legal means to transfer appre-
hended suspects to local authorities, as the legal mandate applied to piracy but not
human smuggling.9 For these reasons, military experts and personnel were sceptical of
the idea of deploying military means to deal with the migration crisis, with the EU Military
Committee even opposing the HR/VP, Commission, and EEAS suggestion (Johansen
2020). As argued by one of our interviewed naval officials: “They looked at Atalanta as
a model […] but there were big differences between the two operations which meant
that the success of Atalanta could not be copied to Sophia”.10 As feared by military
and other experts, Sophia encountered many different challenges, both in terms of refu-
gees rights and efficiency (FCO 2017). A strategic review of the operation for example
showed that Sophia had conducted “more than 1,700 hailings and more than 100 friendly
approaches”, but had inspected only “three vessels under the provisions of UNSCR 2420,
which led to seizures of prohibited arms”, suggesting rather modest results (EEAS 2018,
p. 5). Nonetheless, and contrary to what one would expect if the decision to launch a
naval mission were based on well-thought-out efficiency considerations, the institutional
setting of Atalanta served as a model for Sophia. We see these similarities across all the
main aspects of the mission – (i) the military/naval response, (ii) coordination and mari-
time security cooperation, and (iii) the training and capacity building dimension.
(i) The naval/military response: Pirates, smugglers, and terrorists
First, in both missions, the military focus was on deterrence and prevention. In the
national and EU discourses and policies, both piracy and irregular migration have increas-
ingly been addressed in a transnational security frame, launched as actions developed to
deal with particular challenges (Guilfoyle 2016, Roberts 2018). Piracy has been framed as a
menace to the collective interest in upholding the freedom of navigation; in turn, the
rising number of asylum seeker boat arrivals into Europe was seen to erode national
security and state sovereignty (Guilfoyle 2016). Both phenomena were thus cast as secur-
ity threats to the EU’s seaspace and maritime borders, requiring robust interventions and
coercive actions to prevent and/or curb migratory influxes (Dombrowski and Reich 2019).
The introduction of more restrictive measures and the use of military force gained
increasing political traction after officials expressed concerns about an alleged nexus
between Somali piracy and irregular migration on the one hand, and terrorism on the
other.11 Similar issue-linkage patterns in the EU response to the migration crisis empha-
sised migrant smugglers facilitating unlawful cross-border movements for profit and their
potential involvement in other forms of transnational organised crime or terrorism. ´The
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UNSC Resolution 2240 (2015), which authorised the interception of suspected vessels off
Libya’s coast, flagged migrant smuggling and human trafficking as threats potentially
supporting organised crime and terrorist activities in Libya. Similarly, UNSC Resolution
2292 (2016), which allowed for the inspection of suspected embargo-breaking vessels
off Libya, highlighted the dangers of smuggled arms falling into the hands of terrorist
groups. Against this backdrop, the British, French, and Spanish officials reinforced the
notion of a “terrorism – arms proliferation – migrant smuggling” nexus and agreed to
expand the mandate of Sophia (UN Press 2016). At the EU level, the six-month report
of the operation called for a clear understanding of how smuggling and trafficking net-
works worked, including “[…] where they might interact with other illegal and terrorist
organisations” (EEAS 2016, p. 17). To counter potential terrorist threats, states thus had
to balance humanitarian tasks with beefed-up security measures (Sénat de la France
2015). These actions, however, targeted not only smugglers but extended de facto to
the victims of smuggling or trafficking themselves (Moreno-Lax 2018, Stierl 2019).
Consequently, military efforts in both operations have focused on deterrence and dis-
ruption strategies aimed at preventing or containing the movement of pirates or irregular
migrants. Atalanta’s ultimate rationale was to prevent and avert piracy as this impeded
the free flow of humanitarian aid and merchant shipping. For this purpose, naval
vessels patrolled major sea lanes and used “threats of military force, apprehension, and
prosecution” (Gilmer 2014, p. 22). Disruption, aiming at interrupting piratical activity,
occurred both at sea through the destruction of pirate vessels, the confiscation of ammu-
nition, and the apprehension of suspects, as well as on land, through “over the beach”
operations (Gilmer 2014).
In a similar vein, Operation Sophia mainly focused on disrupting the “business model”
of migrant smuggling, seen both as a criminal enterprise and a push factor. As empha-
sised by the Deputy Commander (2019) of the operation: “All aspects of Sophia are
devoted to fighting trafficking […]; we rescued lots of people, but not as part of the
mandate”. The use of naval assets reflected this ranking of priorities: instead of dispatch-
ing coast guard vessels focusing on SAR, member states relied on frigates, which were
better equipped for gathering intelligence and dismantling trafficking networks.12 More-
over, this is also made evident in the operation’s strategic review, which summarised its
primary results as “the apprehension of 148 suspects” and the “neutralization of some 550
assets” (EEAS 2018, p. 5).
(ii) Coordination and maritime security cooperation
Another area in which the EU has visibly tapped into existing counter-piracy governance
mechanisms and expertise to respond to challenges posed by migration is maritime
security cooperation. Two policy forums in particular stand out: the Contact Group for
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) and the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction
(SHADE) mechanism in the Indian Ocean, and their corresponding structures in the Med-
iterranean, respectively: the Central Mediterranean Contact Group (CMCG) and the SHADE
MED.
The CGPCS was established in January 2009 as a voluntary, informal, and inclusive fra-
mework for consultation and coordination on counter-piracy policies among more than
50 states and international organisations. The open architecture of the format has
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enabled the EU, especially EUNAVFOR representatives, to play an important role in the
forum. The EU has regularly taken part in the group’s biannual plenary where participants
discussed and agreed on common strategies to combat piracy, as well as in its specialised
and technical working groups (Mitcham 2018). Moreover, from January 2014 to January
2016, the EU was entrusted with the CGPCS chairmanship. This mandate, carried out
jointly by the European Commission and the EEAS, offered unprecedented opportunities
for the EU to steer global counter-piracy initiatives by setting the agenda, shaping nego-
tiations, and drafting the group’s communiqué (Bueger 2016). This meant that the Union
could now draw on its newly acquired experience to engage in some degree of learning
about how to tackle maritime insecurity more effectively.13
By comparison, no inclusive and flexible mechanism or dedicated forum existed to sys-
tematically address these topics in the Mediterranean (Seyle and Madsen 2016). The
initiative to establish a new venue for cooperation came from the Italian Interior Minister
in March 2017, after the adoption of the Malta declaration on the external aspects of
migration and the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding between Italy and
Libya. Both documents called for intensified cooperation with Libya and neighbouring
North African and sub-Saharan countries to facilitate the exchange of information and
disrupt smuggling networks on the Central Mediterranean route (Council 2017). To this
end, the Home Affairs ministers of six member states (Italy, Malta, France, Germany,
Austria, and Slovenia), plus Switzerland, Libya, and Tunisia, decided to set up a Contact
Group in the Central Mediterranean (CMCG 2017). The composition of the new forum
included the ministers of interior of participating countries, as well as the HR/VP and
the European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship.
Notwithstanding various differences in terms of size, diversity of membership, or com-
plexity of format, the purpose and functioning of the CMCG were largely inspired by the
logic of the CGPCS.14 First, like the CGPCS, the CMCG sought to coordinate responses to a
common problem characterised by complexity and urgency. Through its coordinating
role, the CGPCS had an essential contribution to the success of counter-piracy actions
and thus provided a familiar crisis-coping mechanism.15 Second, the Contact Group pre-
served the CGPCS’ flexible membership and agenda: interested EU states and partner
countries were welcome to join the group at any point, while priorities for common
action were addressed on an ad hoc basis. Third, the CMCG functioned through a
series of flexible high-level meetings, during which participants set the agenda. Fourth,
as in the case of the CGPCS, the EU secured an important position in agenda setting
and consultations in the CMCG through the participation of its high-level officials. None-
theless, despite early enthusiasm, the CMCG never equalled the same longevity or success
as the CGPCS, and after only three meetings, discussions were moved to other forums.16
Another telling example of institutional “copying” is offered by the SHADE mechanism
of maritime security regional cooperation. Originally established in early 2009, SHADE
conferences were organised biannually in Bahrain to coordinate naval counter-piracy
forces and develop a common understanding of maritime (in)security. The command
of EUNAVFOR Atalanta in particular had a key role in the establishment and functioning
of SHADE, co-chairing the forum’s meetings on a rotational basis. EU officials were also
active in mobilising support for enhanced cooperation and information sharing among
various independent deployers (Forbes 2018).
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SHADE was widely seen as a “major success” and one of the most important out-
growths of the CGPCS (Houben 2014, p. 28). Three main factors accounted for its
success. First, the informal and apolitical character of the venue eschewed cumbersome
processes and political sensitivities, allowing participants to focus entirely on building
maritime awareness. Second, SHADE was inclusive, bringing together numerous partici-
pants, including force-providing states, multi-national military operations, international
and regional organisations, and maritime industry representatives. Third, actors focused
on the exchange of tactical and operational information, leading to concrete and tangible
results (Houben 2014, p. 29).
Building on this example, SHADE MED was launched in November 2015 at the initiative
of the Italian Navy and has been held biannually since then. It acts as a forum where
national representatives and organisations affected by the migratory phenomenon in
the Mediterranean meet to de-conflict and coordinate their efforts by sharing situational
awareness, trend assessment, and best practices (EUNAVFOR MED 2016). The key role of
the Italian Navy in SHADE MED is further indicative of the additional importance of Mare
Nostrum as an antecedent. The decision to draw on existing structures was based on two
main factors. First, the SHADE mechanism provided an easy fix that could be imported to
respond to the migration crisis. As stated by a high-ranking naval official: “one of the
lessons from Atalanta was to have a stakeholders meeting where people from all the oper-
ations involved come together and share information, and that happened a year later for
Sophia”.17 Second, the idea of SHADE MED travelled fast via the Italian command of both
operations. As summarised by an EEAS official: “it is impossible for Atalanta not to be a
model for Sophia because almost every naval officer in Europe has been in Atalanta
[…] Atalanta is the benchmark”.18 The operational commander of Sophia further
explained:
I first saw this concept when I worked in Operation Atalanta as the Force Commander at the
European Naval Forces for the Counter Piracy mission off the coast of Somalia. I saw the need
to bring the different organizations that operated in the Mediterranean, along with those
who have a broader interest in irregular migration to discuss issues. (Credendino cited in
Cassidy 2017, p. 17)
The two SHADE mechanisms, however, are not identical: whereas SHADE Bahrain is
“focused at the tactical and operational level […] and promotes de-confliction between
actors that are controlling units in the region”, SHADE MED “has an outreach and strategic
level focus, and promotes cooperation between disparate organisations, rather than the
physical de-confliction of units operating off Libya”.19 Despite these differences, SHADE
has grown into a strong “brand” representing “a useful convening factor [that] has
become synonymous with a collaborative approach to address regional issues”.20
The structure and functioning of SHADE MED were heavily inspired by the anti-piracy
policy forums in at least three respects. First, SHADE MED preserved the voluntary and
non-binding character of the initial SHADE setting, which lacked legal authority but
offered a venue for shared understanding and practical harmonisation (EUNAVFOR
MED 2016). Second, just like SHADE Bahrain, SHADE MED encouraged the inclusive par-
ticipation of national representatives, regional organisations, shipping and industry
groups, law enforcement agencies, and military delegates, amongst others, in its meet-
ings (EUNAVFOR MED 2016). Third, similar to the CGPCS, SHADE MED’s activity was
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organised around plenary sessions and thematic work groups. For example, a communi-
cations and information systems group inside SHADE MED was formed to develop a
SMART system designed to facilitate communication between military, shipping, and
NGO rescue boats, based on the model provided by Atalanta’s Mercury information
sharing system.
(iii) Training and maritime security capacity building
Lastly, the EU has increasingly sought to emulate its comprehensive approach to better
deal with migration issues, explicitly drawing on operation Atalanta. One of the most fre-
quently cited factors contributing to the success of Atalanta was the EU’s so-called “com-
prehensive approach” in the Horn of Africa, which combined civil and military strategies
to address the structural causes of instability, rather than only addressing superficial
symptoms (UKHL 2017). Building on this experience, there were expectations that the
EU could import a similar model into Libya.21
Indeed, both operations adopted similar “failed/failing” state narratives, which por-
trayed maritime insecurity as a result of insufficient regulatory and law enforcement
capacity. Just as the root causes of piracy reflected Somalia’s protracted instability, irregu-
lar migration in the Mediterranean ultimately stemmed from the inability of the Libyan
state to control its maritime borders. As outlined by a naval officer at the OHQ in Rome:
Both operations were initially established to address the symptoms of wider problems, which
were presenting themselves at sea. They were both originally maritime operations, which
then evolved in an attempt to address the roots causes of the problems: failed country,
lack of governance, and the inability to cope with internal insecurity […]. Determining
how to apply military force to disrupt that model was a challenge but the overall mission
concept was the same in both operations, as was the desired end state.22
In Somalia, the EU supplemented Operation Atalanta with two follow-up missions: EUTM
Somalia, focused on training, mentoring, and advising activities, and EUCAP Nestor/
Somalia, a civilian maritime capacity building mission. Unsurprisingly, Sophia reproduced
this tripartite blueprint almost identically by incorporating military training and capacity
building into its mandate via two supporting tasks, namely the training of the LNCG, and
implementing the UN arms embargo on the high seas off Libya (Tomic 2017). Just as
EUTM in Somalia, the training of the LNCG was a crucial part of the EU’s “exit strategy”
as revealed by the operation’s six-month report (EEAS 2016, p. 22). Joint training exercises
were expected to build confidence and thus enable a swift move to the next phases of the
operation, which required the consent of Libyan authorities (EEAS 2016).
5. Conclusion
This article set out to explain how we can understand the launch of an EU military oper-
ation in response to the migration crisis. Empirically, we have shown that the EU’s policies,
practices, and discourses surrounding its fight against migrant smuggling were inspired
by its previous anti-piracy experience and by the Italian naval mission, Mare Nostrum.
While the critical juncture resulting from the April 2015 shipwrecks near the island of Lam-
pedusa galvanised member states into action and facilitated consensus on the need to
take action, EU policy-makers had little time to devise new solutions and turned
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instead to readily available templates for action on which member states could agree in
record time. EU institutions like the Commission, the HR/VP, and the EEAS – together with
member states such as Italy – played a critical role in tabling a proposal for an EU-led
mission. As shown, their choice of response and their rapid agreement on launching a
naval operation can be explained through the process of copying. While Operation
Mare Nostrum opened the path for a naval response to migration in the Mediterranean,
Operation Atalanta provided a template on which Operation Sophia was planned and
deployed.
Analytically, we argue that this decision can best be described by a revised version of
the concept of “copying” (Verdun 2015), whereby actors in crisis situations, or other situ-
ations characterised by a feeling of urgency, use contingent learning (Kamkhaji and
Radaelli 2017) to quickly evaluate potential policy responses and institutional reforms,
leading them to establish new institutions or policy actions by borrowing in some way
from already existing institutional configurations, policies, or practices.
By teasing out the importance of copying for understanding the EU’s puzzling decision
to launch a military mission in response to a civilian and humanitarian crisis, the article
also contributes to a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying policy develop-
ments in the area of CSDP. Rather than suggesting that the EU selects the most efficient
means to deal with a particular crisis, the case of Operation Sophia illustrates how the EU’s
choice of policy instrument was influenced by path dependence in connected fields,
where contingent learning led to copying previous decisions and institutional structures.
While further study is needed, our findings also suggest that such copying may be
especially likely when the EU is faced with situations characterised by crisis or a sense
of urgency, which is often the case in the EU’s largely reactive security policies; while criti-
cal junctures may allow for new possibilities of action, the urgency of crisis can limit the
scope of what those actions may be. In times of crisis, decision-makers thus draw on tried
and tested institutional structures and past knowledge to formulate solutions to current
problems. Copying may be an understudied mechanism that, further explored, can yield
important insights into new actions and integration in EU security policies.
Notes
1. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for reminding us to make this clarification and
linking to this debate.
2. Even in the Mediterranean we see examples of this more conventional learning in response to
crisis. Cusumano (2019a) describes how NGOs developed two separate strategies through
selective emulation to respond to restrictions placed on SAR missions.
3. The analysis draws on three main sources. First, it examines EU policy documents such as
EEAS strategic reviews, EUNAVFOR mission factsheets, European Council decisions, High
Representative of the EU/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) official declarations,
and, whenever available, leaked working documents on sensitive or less publicly
debated aspects of Operation Sophia from 2015 until 2020. Second, it builds on the
existing secondary literature on the CSDP, the migration crisis, and the EU response to
piracy and migrant smuggling in particular. Third, the article draws on 17 in-depth,
semi-structured interviews with EU officials involved in the planning and conduct of
operations Atalanta and Sophia, conducted in person in Brussels or via e-mail/Skype
between September 2017 and February 2020.
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4. Interview (17) with official from OHQ of Operation Sophia, e-mail, February 2020; interview
(14) with naval officer, Skype, October 2019; interview (15) with naval officer, Skype,
October 2019.
5. Interview (17) with official from OHQ of Operation Sophia, e-mail, February 2020.
6. Interview (1) with EEAS official, Skype, September 2017; interview (2) with EU diplomat, Brus-
sels, September 2017.
7. Interview (17) with official from OHQ of Operation Sophia, e-mail, February 2020.
8. Interview (15) with naval officer, Skype, October 2019.
9. Interview (9) with EEAS official, Brussels, December 2019.
10. Interview (16) with naval officer, conducted by Dr. John Sherwood, Naval History and Heritage
Command, Skype, October 2019.
11. Interview (2) with EU diplomat, Brussels, September 2017.
12. Interview (16) with naval officer, Skype, September 2019.
13. Interview (9) with EEAS official, Brussels, December 2019.
14. Interview (12) with European Commission official, Brussels, June 2019; interview (13) with
European Commission official, Brussels, July 2019.
15. Interviews (10-11) with EEAS official, Brussels, December 2019.
16. Interview (5) with EU official, Skype, December 2018.
17. Interview (16) with naval official, Skype, October 2019.
18. Interview (4) with EEAS official, Brussels, June 2018.
19. Interview (17) with official from OHQ of Operation Sophia, e-mail, February 2020.
20. Interview (17) with official from OHQ of Operation Sophia, e-mail, February 2020
21. Interview (3) with EEAS official, Brussels, June 2018.
22. Interview (17) with official from OHQ of Operation Sophia, e-mail, February 2020.
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